By Lawrence G. Ang[1] Climate Change Commission, January 20, 2010
As the dust settles on the chilly streets of Copenhagen, and the hoopla over suited men and women and funny accents—it’s clay-mate chay-ange mate!—now almost a distant memory for the locals, the rest of the world continues to cry foul over the disappointing outcome of the United Nations Climate Change Conference hosted in the hometown of the Little Mermaid herself last December 2009.
So what went wrong in Copenhagen? It seems the answer to this question will be the stuff of legend and hundreds of PhD dissertations for years to come. Suffice to say that two weeks of high level negotiations and intense NGO lobbying were not enough to arrive at a global political consensus on how the world shall urgently address climate change through the building blocks of mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and finance.
In a last-ditch effort to save the Conference after days of political deadlock, and with “comprehensive legally-binding agreement” sounding more unrealistic by the second, a document called the “Copenhagen Accord” was carved up by 28 “representative countries” and was presented to the Parties as basis for further deliberations on the road to the next Climate Change Conference in Mexico 2010.
Relative to the lengthier yet more comprehensive texts used as the basis for global climate negotiations since Bali in 2007, a browse of the 5-page Copenhagen Accord will lead one to immediately believe the document to be neither ambitious nor equitable. For indeed, the only semblance of a “target” articulated within the Accord is that of limiting the rise of global temperatures to 2ºC, and that of eventually disbursing 100 billion dollars annually among developing countries for their mitigation and adaptation efforts between 2010 and 2020.
Though there is broad mention in the Accord of operationalizing adaptation, technology transfer, and REDD+ immediately, gone are the emissions reduction targets by developed countries to the year 2050 which make action on climate change meaningful and ultimately effective. Hence, it would so appear the Accord seriously dampens global efforts to make climate change a most urgent priority for humankind.
Unsurprising then that, upon hearing of the Accord’s existence, several country Parties chose merely to “take note” of the document, as opposed to signing on to it and adopting its contents in a politically, let alone legally, binding way. In other words, so unambitious is the Accord, that several countries are seriously against its eventual adoption regardless of the offer of operationalizing key programmatic and financial resources.
However, it would be good to note that the climate negotiations landscape is ever-changing, so for anyone to judge the Accord, at any stage, to be simply “good” or “bad” might prove unwise politically.
This final point then allows me to elegantly segway into a set of interesting questions for us, perpetual learners that we are, who follow REDD+. How should we move forward with REDD+ given current difficulties in operationalizing an international REDD+ mechanism? What possible implications will signing on or not signing on to the Accord have on our National REDD+ Programs? Finally, how do we position ourselves for REDD+ on the road to Mexico 2010?
I will, in my own capacity, attempt to briefly address these questions one by one.
How should we move forward with REDD+ given current difficulties in operationalizing an international REDD+ mechanism?
Contrary to popular belief, Copenhagen was not the monumental disaster nay-sayers are making it look like.
Significant progress was made in further consolidating/removing brackets in the adaptation, technology transfer, and most especially the REDD+ texts—progress which gave negotiators hope that world leaders will be able to resolve the remaining deadlocks of the texts on the last days of the Conference, if not in Copenhagen then in Mexico.
For example, the REDD+ text secures the scope of REDD+ activities to be supported to reduced deforestation and degradation now including the enhancement of forest carbon stocks. It also places importance on a phase-driven approach, and ensures social, environmental and governance safeguards are respected for doing REDD+—no questions asked.
The only major areas of contestation remaining are on the scale of REDD+ activities (subnational versus national only) and whether or not REDD+ should operate as a nationally appropriate mitigation action (NAMA) with implications for financing and prospective MRV (measurement, reporting and verification) regimes.
For a country like the Philippines which is currently mobilizing its National REDD+ Strategy, the result of Copenhagen should not deter ongoing efforts for REDD readiness activities. It actually should be an incentive to make sure we become much more prepared to absorb the benefits of an international REDD+ mechanism when it is put into place hopefully by Mexico.
Being prepared for REDD+ 2010 means finalizing the country’s National REDD+ Strategy, ensuring membership to the UN-REDD Programme, as much as possible identifying baseline data and priority forestlands, and educating stakeholders on REDD+ through tireless readiness activities and by harmonizing REDD+ within the broader National Strategy Framework and Action Plan on Climate Change.
What possible implications will signing on or not signing on to the Accord have on our National REDD+ Programs?
At this stage, little. Signing on to the Accord would not necessarily mean we get a lion’s share or even a baby’s share of the 100 billion dollars to be made available for developing country signatories of the Accord—which now stands at less than half of the developing world—let alone have this money assigned for REDD+.
Although the French and the British have pledged some 3.5 billion dollars for REDD+ exclusively, there is still some question as to who is eligible for such funds—signatories only to the Accord?—and how such funds will be managed and disbursed—most probably through bodies like the UN-REDD Programme which emphasizes my earlier suggestion to be a member immediately.
Finally, how do we position ourselves for REDD+ on the road to Mexico 2010?
There is now talk of “salvaging” the Accord by suggesting it be considered as a document for further negotiations within the greater tracks of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which utilize the earlier mentioned lengthier but more comprehensive texts.
This allows the progress of the REDD+ text to be acknowledged beyond the non-adoption of the Accord which does not operationalize a REDD+ mechanism. In doing so, due regard will be given to the gains made in the abovementioned version of the REDD+ text negotiators have been working so hard on, and also ensure some measure of public acceptability towards an international REDD+ mechanism.
The Philippines should therefore strategize to bring back the key principles, scope, and scale integral to making REDD+ work in the country, back on the discussion tables—and this goes for both national and international discussions.
As I make it a point to never fail to mention, the Philippines should make sure it takes advantage of this global discourse on forests and climate change by leveraging the protection and sustainable management of its forests beyond what is happening at the international level.
REDD+ stands as a “new” model to couch our advocacies and policymaking thrusts towards stopping deforestation and degradation and improving the quality of our forests.
So by all means, if there is financing to be had in Mexico from the establishment of an international REDD+ mechanism, let us do everything we can to meaningfully absorb and translate that financing to solid benefits on the ground.
But even without an international agreement on REDD+ by Mexico—knock on SFM certified wood—let us make sure we recognize the value of our National REDD+ Strategy and the fresh and robust opportunity it provides for all forest stakeholders to engage their concerns and resources with the bureaucracy, while uniquely providing us an exciting venue to working towards a truly carbon-negative Philippines.
[1] Lawrence Ang works for the Climate Change Commission currently based in Malacanang, Manila. He was part of the Philippine Delegation to the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference who alongside Tony La Vina of the Ateneo School of Governance, Vicky Tauli-Corpuz of Tebtebba Foundation, and Romy Trono of Conservation International, negotiated for REDD+ issues.
